Truth and Truthmakers

Cambridge University Press (2004)
Abstract
Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.
Keywords Truth  Realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $57.70 used (41% off)   $66.00 new (32% off)   $85.10 direct from Amazon (13% off)    Amazon page
Call number B5704.A753.T78 2004
ISBN(s) 0521838320
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,105
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.

View all 82 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

125 ( #7,347 of 1,101,764 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #28,234 of 1,101,764 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.