David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 70 (1):11-23 (2010)
In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either because they fail to see everything that is at work in that reasoning, or because they misunderstand what it is that the reasoning aims to show.
|Keywords||truth liar paradox Sorensen epistemicism truthmakers|
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References found in this work BETA
Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2006). Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):395 – 416.
Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
Laurence Goldstein (1985). The Paradox of The Liar -- A Case of Mistaken Identity. Analysis 45 (1):9-13.
Laurence Goldstein (1992). `This Statement is Not True' is Not True. Analysis 52 (1):1-5.
Patrick Grim (2000). The Being That Knew Too Much. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):141-154.
Citations of this work BETA
Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2011). No-No. Paradox and Consistency. Analysis 71 (3):472-478.
Roberto Loss (2012). Escape From Epistemic Island. Analysis 72 (3):498-506.
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