Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility

Analysis 70 (1):11-23 (2010)
Abstract
In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either because they fail to see everything that is at work in that reasoning, or because they misunderstand what it is that the reasoning aims to show.
Keywords truth  liar paradox  Sorensen  epistemicism  truthmakers
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
Patrick Grim (2000). The Being That Knew Too Much. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):141-154.

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