Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):335-344 (2011)
|Abstract||In a recent paper in this journal, Mark Balaguer develops and defends a new version of mathematical fictionalism, what he calls ‘Hermeneutic non-assertivism’, and responds to some recent objections to mathematical fictionalism that were launched by John Burgess and others. In this paper I provide some fairly compelling reasons for rejecting Hermeneutic non-assertivism — ones that highlight an important feature of what understanding mathematics involves (or, as we shall see, does not involve)|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
M. Balaguer (2011). Reply to Armour-Garb. Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):345-348.
Gábor Forrai (2010). What Mathematicians' Claims Mean : In Defense of Hermeneutic Fictionalism. Hungarian Philosophical Review 54 (4):191-203.
Mary Leng (2005). Revolutionary Fictionalism: A Call to Arms. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (3):277-293.
Chris John Daly (2008). Fictionalism and the Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440.
B. Armour-Garb (2011). The Implausibility of Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism. Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):349-353.
Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2013). From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth‐Theoretic Fictionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3).
Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2004). The Return of Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):149–188.
Phil Corkum (2012). Aristotle on Mathematical Truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1057-1076.
Sarah Hoffman (2004). Kitcher, Ideal Agents, and Fictionalism. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (1):3-17.
Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
Mark Balaguer, Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557-579.
Added to index2011-07-12
Total downloads46 ( #23,896 of 549,671 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,807 of 549,671 )
How can I increase my downloads?