Understanding and Mathematical Fictionalism

Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):335-344 (2011)
Abstract
In a recent paper in this journal, Mark Balaguer develops and defends a new version of mathematical fictionalism, what he calls ‘Hermeneutic non-assertivism’, and responds to some recent objections to mathematical fictionalism that were launched by John Burgess and others. In this paper I provide some fairly compelling reasons for rejecting Hermeneutic non-assertivism — ones that highlight an important feature of what understanding mathematics involves (or, as we shall see, does not involve)
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References found in this work BETA
John P. Burgess (2004). Mathematics and Bleak House. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (1):18-36.
Citations of this work BETA
E. C. Bourne (2013). Fictionalism. Analysis 73 (1):147-162.
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M. Balaguer (2011). Reply to Armour-Garb. Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):345-348.
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Mark Balaguer (1998). Attitudes Without Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.
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