Egalitarian Justice versus the Right to Privacy?

Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (02):91- (2000)
Abstract
In their celebrated essay “The Right to Privacy,” Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis identify as the generic privacy value “the right to be let alone.”1 This same phrase occurs in Louis Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. U.S.2 This characterization of privacy has been found objectionable by philosophers acting as conceptual police. For example, William Parent asserts that one can wrongfully fail to let another person alone in all sorts of ways such as assault that intuitively do not qualify as violations of privacy and thus cannot be violations of the right to privacy
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Citations of this work BETA
Carl Knight (2013). Luck Egalitarianism. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
Takashi Kibe (2011). The Relational Approach to Egalitarian Justice: A Critique of Luck Egalitarianism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (1):1-21.
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