David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (4):488–497 (1999)
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s interesting criticisms of the ideal of equality of opportunity for welfare provide a welcome occasion for rethinking the requirements of egalitarian distributive justice.1 In the essay he criticizes I had proposed that insofar as we think distributive justice requires equality of any sort, we should conceive of distributive equality as equal opportunity provision. Roughly put, my suggestion was that equality of opportunity for welfare obtains among a group of people when all would have the same expected welfare over the course of their lives if each behaved as prudently as it would be reasonable to expect her to behave. My specific proposal was more demanding, holding that when an age cohort reaches the onset of responsible adulthood, they enjoy equal opportunity for welfare when for each of them, the best sequence of choices that it would be reasonable to expect the person to follow would yield the same expected welfare for all, the second-best sequence of choices would also yield the same expected welfare for all, and so on through the array of lifetime choice sequences each faces. (In the jargon of my 1989 essay, equal opportunity for welfare obtains when everyone faces effectively equivalent sets of life options.)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Marc Fleurbaey & Alex Voorhoeve (2012). Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 24 (3):381-398.
Carl Knight (2013). Luck Egalitarianism. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
Carl Knight (2005). In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism. Res Publica 11 (1):1-10.
Carl Knight (2013). Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1061-1073.
Carl Knight (2011). Climate Change and the Duties of the Disadvantaged: Reply to Caney. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (4):531-542.
Similar books and articles
Richard J. Arneson (1990). Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (2):158-194.
John O'Dea (2007). The Value in Equal Opportunity: Reply to Kershnar. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):177–187.
Clare Chambers (2009). Each Outcome is Another Opportunity: Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (4):374-400.
K. Lippert-Rasmussen (1999). Arneson on Equality of Opportunity for Welfare. Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (4):478–487.
Richard J. Arneson (1989). Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare. Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.
Rodney G. Peffer, What is to Be Distributed? The Paideia Project.
Alex Voorhoeve (2005). Equal Opportunity, Equality, and Responsibility. Dissertation, University of London
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads181 ( #3,440 of 1,101,623 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #28,147 of 1,101,623 )
How can I increase my downloads?