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- Richard Arneson, The End of Welfare as We Know It? Scanlon Versus Welfarist Consequentialism.(Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice, 2002) Richard J. Arneson A notable achievement of T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other1 is its sustained critique of welfarist consequentialism.2 Consequentialism is the doctrine that one morally ought always to do an act, of the alternatives, that brings about a state of affairs that is no less good than any other one could bring about. Welfarism is the view that what makes a state of affairs better or worse is some increasing function of the welfare for persons realized in it. I shall argue that Scanlon’s critique, though containing much of interest, fails on its own terms.
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Discussion of Richard Arneson, The end of welfare as we know it? Scanlon versus welfarist consequentialism
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