Frege, as-if Platonism, and Pragmatism

Journal of Critical Realism 4 (1):1-27 (2005)
Abstract
This paper is divided into two main sections. In the first, I attempt to show that the characterization of Frege as a redundancy theorist is not accurate. Using one of Wolfgang Carl's recent works as a foil, I argue that Frege countenances a realm of abstract objects including truth, and that Frege's Platonist commitments inform his epistemology and embolden his antipsychologistic project. In the second section, contrasting Frege's Platonism with pragmatism, I show that even though Frege's metaphysical position concerning truth has been criticized as reproachable, I argue that it may be useful for people to think like Platonists while conducting their scientific and philosophical inquiries
Keywords TRUTH   CARL   REALISM   PRAGMATISM   ANTI-REALISM   FREGE   AS-IF PLATONISM
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