|Abstract||It has been known for quite a while now that the on-going project of constructing an acceptable population axiology has gloomy prospects. Already in Derek Parfit’s seminal contribution to the topic, an informal paradox was presented and later contributions have proved similar results.1 All of these contributions invoke, however, some version of a principle – the Mere Addition Principle – which is controversial.2 In Arrhenius (1998), I presented a theorem which didn’t invoke this controversial principle but replaced it with logically and intuitively weaker conditions. Still, however, one of the conditions in my theorem shares with these earlier results the presupposition that welfare can be measured on at least an interval scale.3 One can deny this and, as a matter of..|
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