Can the person affecting restriction solve the problems in population ethics?
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||The Person Affecting Restriction, in its slogan form, states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for someone.1 It has a strong intuitive appeal and several theorists have suggested that the paradoxical implications in population ethics of “impersonal” welfarist theories, such as classical utilitarianism, could be avoided by adopting the restriction.|
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