Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):749-749 (1998)
|Abstract||The question is broadened from isomorphism to invertible transformation and optimal representation. Motivations are drawn from image compression but with an emphasis on object segmentation. Filling-in is considered as the phenomenal side of the binding process with back-surface filling-in being important. Finally, re-normalization of local filtering by globally integrated context is emphasized.|
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