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- Christopher E. Arthur (1976). Gadamer and Hirsch: The Canonical Work and the Interpreter's Intention. Philosophy and Social Criticism 4 (2):183-197.
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This essay traces the trajectory of Gadamer’s retrieval of mimesis by reconstructing his interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics. Mimesis names the transformationthat takes place when the work constitutes a structure (Gebilde) that offers a presentation (Darstellung) in which the spectator participates. The reconstructiontreats Gadamer’s interpretation of mythos, mimesis, and katharsis as he appropriates them to his understanding of the work as a “transformation into structure” which is a “transformation into the true” that effects a self-transformation in the spectator. By transforming mimesis Gadamer retrieves this ancient concept for the hermeneutic understanding of the work of art as an event of being.
No categories
Gadamer’s account of interpretation draws from Aristotle’s concept of phronesis to explain the relationship between the universal of the text and the particular of the interpreter. However, Gadamer does not address the moral dimensions of his theory of hermeneutic experience. Experience in general makes us aware of our the particular finiteness of our understanding, and in the particular case of the hermeneutic experience, we can be made aware of the finiteness of human existence in general through the challenging of enough of our radically held beliefs. Our fear of death comes into play, and the ability to withstand such fear would be courage. Drawing from Aristotle, Paul Tillich, and Chögyam Trungpa, I work to reinterpret courage for the particular situation of Gadamerian dialogue.
The essentials of intention -- Putting intention to work -- The connection.
This paper provides a detailed account of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and its relationship to contemporary problems in legal theory. I first demonstrate that Gadamer's approach charts a course between the inflated claims of critical legal studies and the subjectivism of the law and literature movement. I then interrogate the hermeneutical approach from the perspective of Habermas's critical theory. I conclude that Ricoeur's intervention in the Gadamer-Habermas debate helps significantly to draw out the critical elements of Gadamer's work. I conclude by developing new model of legal practice and theory grounded in the textuality of law.
Paul Klee's art found broad impact upon philosophers of varying commitments, including Hans-Georg Gadamer. Moreover, Klee himself was not only one of the most important artists of aesthetic modernism but one of its leading theoreticians, and much in his work, as in Gadamer's, originated in post-Kantian literary theory's explications of symbol and allegory. Indeed at one point in Truth and Method, Gadamer associates his project for a general "theory of hermeneutic experience" not only with Goethe's metaphysical account of the symbolic but equally with a "rehabilitation" of allegory. In this paper, I examine this position and Gadamer's own use of it in his analysis of Klee's work, contrasting it with that of Walter Benjamin's account of allegory, equally indebted to Goethe and this archive. Finally, I contrast the resulting interpretations of Klee, discussing the implications that evolve for understanding both Gadamer and Benjamin— but equally for understanding Klee's work and, provisionally, the work of art, thus construed, for philosophy.
The rhetorical dimensions of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics have not been fully developed by his commentators, resulting in an overly conservative rendering of his philosophy. Drawing out the rhetorical features of his work, we find that Gadamer regards textual interpretation as a rhetorical accomplishment. This characterization leads to a rich conception of critical hermeneutics. The article develops Gadamer's rhetorical hermeneutics by contrasting his approach with Paul Ricoeur's famous intervention in the Gadamer-Habermas debate, and looks to Gadamer's account of legal practice as a manifestation of critical hermeneutics in action.
Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900) is widely recognized as the leading exponent of philosophical hermeneutics. The essays in this collection examine Gadamer's biography, the core of hermeneutical theory, and the significance of his work for ethics, aesthetics, the social sciences, and theology. There is full consideration of Gadamer's appropriation of Hegel, Heidegger and the Greeks, as well as his relation to modernity, critical theory and poststructuralism.
Gadamer and Habermas both argue that some earlier theorists of interpretation in the human sciences, despite recognizing the meaningful character of social reality, still succumb to objectivism because they fail to conceive the relation of interpreters to their subjects in terms of cross-cultural normative "dialogue." In particular, Gadamer and Habermas claim that the most prominent nineteenth-century philosopher of the human sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey, fell prey to a misleading Cartesian outlook which sought to ground the objectivity of interpretation on complete transcendence of the interpreter's present cultural and historical situation. This article challenges Gadamer's and Habermas's claim by arguing that new research on nineteenth-century hermeneutic thought reveals Dilthey to be much more aware of the reflexive, present-centered nature of historical research than they maintain and further that their own "dialogical" model of interpretation suffers from notable obscurities which Dilthey's work itself helps expose. Key Words: Dilthey Gadamer Habermas hermeneutics.
Hans-Georg Gadamer is often criticized for his account of the fusions of horizons as the ideal resolution of dialogue. I argue that in fact it is an excellent account of the successful resolution of dialogue, but only in light of a proper understanding of what Gadamer means by 'horizon' and how then horizons are fused. I do this by showing how Gadamer is drawing on the technical sense of 'horizon' found in Edmund Husserl's and Martin Heidegger's phenomenologies. In the process I show why a prominent criticism of Gadamer's account of the fusion of horizons, a criticism presented most forcefully by E. D. Hirsch, is mistaken.
A collection of essays including one by Gadamer himself reflecting on his life and work. There are also special sections linking Gadamer to the work of other major philosophers, including Heidegger, Ricoeur, Barthes and Derrida.
Discussion of Christopher E. Arthur, Gadamer and Hirsch: The canonical work and the interpreter's intention
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