On thought experiments as a priori science

Abstract Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non-propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a new natural interpretation in terms of which the phenomenon can be redescribed free of contradiction.
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    David C. Gooding (1992). What is Experimental About Thought Experiments? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:280 - 290.
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