|Abstract||This paper provides a simple proof of mind-body dualism. I show, first, that all properties known to humankind, aside from qualitative properties of consciousness, are fundamentally relational properties. I then show that relational properties are always fully describable in language. Finally, I point out that qualitative properties of consciousness are clearly not fully describable in language. Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind.|
|Keywords||mind body dualism consciousness|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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