Foundations of a Nonideal Theory of Justice

Abstract Until recently, Rawlsian orthodoxy held that John Rawls’ ideal theory of justice as fairness can be straightforwardly extended to nonideal social conditions. A. John Simmons and I have demonstrated this view to be false. Rawls lacks any analysis of transitional fairness. Simmons, however, is skeptical about the possibility of constructing a comprehensive theory of transitional fairness. I show that such a theory is possible by beginning a project that Rawls once suggested: systematically extending his “original position” to nonideal theory. I construct a nonideal theoretic original position on the basis of Rawls’ arguments, showing how it is both reasonable and rational for the parties to prioritize a class of "nonideal-theoretic primary goods" over the satisfaction of Rawls' principles and priority relations (contrary to Rawlsian orthodoxy). I show that there are at least three nonideal-theoretic primary goods, and that the parties to the original position have sufficient reason to agree to certain priority relations among them. Finally, I show that the parties to the original position should rationally agree to a general principle for distributing these goods, and by extension, to three lexically ordered corollary principles for distributing each of the three goods discussed.
Keywords Rawls  justice  nonideal theory  ideal theory  fairness
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