Free choice permission is strong permission

Synthese 145 (3):303 - 323 (2005)
Free choice permission, a crucial test case concerning the semantics/ pragmatics boundary, usually receives a pragmatic treatment. But its pragmatic features follow from its semantics. We observe that free choice inferences are defeasible, and defend a semantics of free choice permission as strong permission expressed in terms of a modal conditional in a nonmonotonic logic.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118599
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References found in this work BETA
Hans Kamp (1973). Free Choice Permission. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:57 - 74.

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Martin Mose Bentzen (2014). Action Type Deontic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (4):397-414.

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