Abstract

The dissertation examines several proposals for necessary and sufficient conditions for understanding sentences of a natural language within the context of a truth conditional theory of meaning. Any such proposal has two parts: first, an account of meaning, second, an account of an interpreter's attitudes toward meanings and meaningful expressions of a language. Efforts to provide an account of linguistic understanding by Frege, Davidson, Dummett and others have largely assumed a certain account of semantic knowledge that leads to difficulties when joined with a truth conditional theory of meaning. It is argued that, rather than abandon an account of meaning in terms of truth conditions, a new account of semantic knowledge is required. A new account is sketched in the final chapter. ;The first chapter describes the "received view" of knowledge of meaning. When this view of knowledge is joined to a simple truth conditional theory of meaning, two puzzles about informativeness result: the problem of informative identity statements and the paradox of analysis. It is argued that an adequate analysis of linguistic understanding should provide solutions to these puzzles. ;The second chapter reviews Frege's analysis of linguistic understanding. It is argued that Frege's analysis faces difficulties because of well-known defects in the Fregean theory of meaning and because it fails to provide a fully satisfactory solution to the paradox of analysis. Explicit knowledge of an adequate truth conditional theory of meaning, it is argued in chapter three, might suffice for linguistic understanding, although Davidson's account should be rejected, because it is based on an inadequate truth conditional theory of meaning. In the fourth chapter, Dummett's analysis of necessary conditions for linguistic understanding is examined. Dummett provides reasons for rejecting the received view of knowledge of meaning but Dummett's positive proposals themselves fail to provide an analysis of linguistic understanding. ;A reinterpretation of an interpreter's attitudes towards truth conditions and meaningful expressions of a natural language is given in chapter five. The reinterpretation is compatible with the criticisms made by Kripke and others of the Fregean theory of meaning, and it tentatively proposes a solution to both puzzles about informativeness.