Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):101–113 (2003)
|Abstract||Berkeley has made the bold claim on behalf of his theory that it is uniquely able to justify the claim that snow is white. But this claim, made most strikingly in the Third of his "Three Dialogues," has been held, most forcefully by Margaret Wilson, to conflict with Berkeley's argument in the First Dialogue that, because of various facts to do with perceptual variation, colors are merely apparent and hence, mind-dependent. This paper develops an alternative reading of the First Dialogue arguments, in which their project is not to establish the mind-dependence of colors but instead to undermine the position that colors are also mind-independent. Under these circumstances, the coherence of the First and the Third Dialogue arguments is assured, just so long as the Third Dialogue claim to have established that snow is really white is not taken to mean that snow is mind-independently white, but instead, something like that our experiences of snow are stably and regularly white|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tor Hernes, Gerhard E. Schjelderup & Anne Live Vaagaasar (2009). White as Snow or Milk? In Christina Garsten & Tor Hernes (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas in Management. Routledge.
Peter Milne (1999). Tarski on Truth and its Definition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:141-167.
Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Nikita D. Roodkowsky (1980). Black Night, White Snow. Thought 55 (2):232-233.
James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Christopher S. Hill (2006). Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):174–181.
Santiago Solis (2007). Snow White and the Seven "Dwarfs" -- Queercripped. Hypatia 22 (1):114-131.
D. Patterson (2003). What is a Correspondence Theory of Truth? Synthese 137 (3):421 - 444.
Daniel Stoljar, The Deflationary Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Matthew McGrath (1997). Weak Deflationism. Mind 106 (421):69-98.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #18,806 of 739,347 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,347 )
How can I increase my downloads?