How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses
Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21 (2009)
| Abstract | Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMorten Søberg (2005). The Duhem‐Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics: A Reinterpretation. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):581-597.
Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.
W. H. Baumer (1963). Von Wright's Paradoxes. Philosophy of Science 30 (2):165-172.
Nicholaos Jones (2009). General Relativity and the Standard Model: Why Evidence for One Does Not Disconfirm the Other. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2):124-132.
Jarrett Leplin (1972). Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology. Philosophy of Science 39 (4):476-490.
James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
Branden Fitelson (2002). Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads35 ( #34,202 of 550,917 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 550,917 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
