Probability all the way up
Synthese 153 (2):187 - 197 (2006)
| Abstract | Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism (‘probability all the way down’) is augmented by the claim that probability cannot be turned into certainty, except by data that logically exclude all alternatives. Once we start being uncertain, no amount of updating will free us from the treadmill of uncertainty. This claim is cast first in objectivist and then in subjectivist terms. | |||||||||
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