Probability without certainty: foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach debate
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453 (2006)
| Abstract | Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but argue that this ambiguity is only apparent if probability theory is viewed within a modal logic. Although there are empirical situations where Reichenbach is right, and others where Lewis’s reasoning seems to be more appropriate, it will become clear that Reichenbach’s stance is the generic one. This follows simply from the fact that, if P(E|G) > 0 and P(E|not-G) > 0, then P(E) > 0. We conclude that this constitutes a threat to epistemic foundationalism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRoderick M. Chisholm (1973). Empirical Knowledge; Readings From Contemporary Sources. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Elliott Sober (forthcoming). Reichenbach's Cubical Universe and the Problem of the External World. Synthese.
F. A. Siegler (1962). Probability, Certainty and Illusions. Inquiry 5 (1-4):91 – 115.
Hans Reichenbach (1952). Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain? Philosophical Review 61 (April):147-159.
David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2008). Reichenbach's Posits Reposited. Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
James Cleve (1977). Probability and Certainty: A Reexamination of the Lewis-Reichenbach Debate. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):323 - 334.
Richard A. Legum (1980). Probability and Foundationalism: Another Look at the Lewis-Reichenbach Debate. Philosophical Studies 38 (4):419 - 425.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads49 ( #21,692 of 548,977 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,799 of 548,977 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
