Reichenbach's posits reposited
Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108 (2008)
| Abstract | Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under particular circumstances, Reichenbach’s approach and that of the Bayesians amount to the same thing, thereby presenting us with a new instance in which chance and credence coincide. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesCarsten Klein (2001). Conventionalism and Realism in Hans Reichenbach's Philosophy of Geometry. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (3):243 – 251.
G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.) (2005). Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.
Elliott Sober (forthcoming). Reichenbach's Cubical Universe and the Problem of the External World. Synthese.
Dennis Dieks (1987). Gravitation as a Universal Force. Synthese 73 (2):381 - 397.
Jeanne Peijnenburg (1999). Are There Mental Entities? Some Lessons From Hans Reichenbach. Sorites 11 (11):66-81.
Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2011). Grounds and Limits Reichenbach and Foundationalist Epistemology. Synthese 181:113-124.
David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads19 ( #64,404 of 549,106 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,106 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
