Abstract

The author sets himself the problem of justifying the moral ought. Moral theorists since Hume have argued that an ought can only be derived from another ought. Utilitarians say we ought to maximize the good, but cannot say why. Intuitionists claim the ought is self evident, but cannot deal satisfactorily with differing intuitions. The failure of the major traditions of Western moral philosophy to successfully explain why we ought to act in certain ways has led to ethical skepticism and moral cynicism. Johnson aims to prove that a self-justifying ought is meaningful and does exist, and that a moral ought can be derived from it. The basis of his proof is the self-justifying nature of the obligation to be rational, which is absolute because no rational argument can be made for irrationality. From this rational ought he develops a moral ought containing the obligation to treat everyone impartially and to promote the happiness of others to the same extent as our own. Thus the question "Why ought I to be moral?" is subsumed under "Why ought I to be rational?", which in turn answers itself. Everyone has an equal right to happiness, and thus an equal claim to be treated impartially, but may waive the claim in particular circumstances. The most common reason for such a waiver is the belief that we can promote our own happiness more effectively in the long run by frequently waiving our claim to equal treatment than by always insisting on it. The author's ultimate conclusion--to maximize happiness and divide it equally among everyone affected by one's actions--is hardly distinguishable from Mill's utilitarianism, but it is reached by severely logical rather than empirical reasoning. The work is a closely argued but ultimately unconvincing effort to provide a theoretical basis for morality.--A. T.