An internal version of epistemic logic
Studia Logica 94 (1) (2010)
| Abstract | Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is one of the agents involved in the situation. For this approach we propose and axiomatize a logical formalism based on epistemic logic. This leads us to formalize some intuitions about the internal approach and about its connections with the external ones. Finally, we show that our internal logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGiacomo Bonanno (2001). Branching Time, Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior 36 (1):57-73.
Nina Gierasimczuk (2009). Bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 169 (2):371-384.
Edmond Wright (2001). A Non-Epistemic, Non-Pictorial, Internal, Material Visual Field. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1010-1011.
Renata Ziemińska (2006). Two Notions of the Internal and Goldman's Epistemic Externalism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):395-400.
Timothy Williamson (2006). Can Cognition Be Factorized Into Internal and External Components? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
William A. Rottschaefer (2003). Assessing the Role of Non-Epistemic Feminist Values in Scientific Inquiry. Behavior and Philosophy 31:225 - 249.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-02-20Total downloads40 ( #29,483 of 556,896 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,931 of 556,896 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
