A Kantian intuitionism
Mind 110 (439):601-635 (2001)
| Abstract | Kant famously said that one could not do morality a worse disservice than to derive it from examples, and this pronouncement, taken together with his formulations and explanations of the categorical imperative, has led some critics to regard him as too abstract. Ross, by contrast, has been widely viewed as taking individual cases of duty to have a kind of epistemic priority over principles of duty, and some of his critics have thus considered him insufficiently systematic, or even dogmatically limited to deliverances of intuition. This paper arises from the conviction that understanding of the categorical imperative may be enhanced by reflection on Rossian principles, and conversely. Kant and other systematic philosophers who have done moral philosophy in the grand style have had too little faith in intuitive singular moral judgement; Ross and other intuitionists have had too little faith in comprehensive moral theory. Drawing in part on an independent account of self-evidence and its relation to intuition, the paper shows how a Rossian view can be integrated with a Kantian moral theory in a way that yields the major benets of both positions: the moral unication possible through the categorical imperative and other notions prominent in Kantian ethics, and the relative closeness to moral practice of Rossian principles | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRobert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
Itay Snir (2010). The “New Categorical Imperative” and Adorno's Aporetic Moral Philosophy. Continental Philosophy Review 43 (3):407-437.
Elizabeth Tropman (2009). Renewing Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
Oliver Sensen (2011). Kant's Conception of Inner Value. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):262-280.
Simon John Duffy (2001). An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism: A Critique of Mackie's Scepticism, and an Alternative Proposal Combining Ross's Intuitionism with a Kantian Epistemology. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Marcus Arvan (2012). Unifying the Categorical Imperative. Southwest Philosophical Review 28 (1):217-225.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). ‘Practical Reason: Categorical Imperative, Maxims, Laws’. In W. Dudley & K. Engelhard (eds.), Kant: Key Concepts. Acumen.
Marcus Willaschek (2009). Right and Coercion: Can Kant's Conception of Right Be Derived From His Moral Theory? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (1):49 – 70.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads87 ( #8,321 of 549,754 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
