Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe
Noûs 28 (4):419-34 (1994)
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| Keywords | Belief Cognition Folk Psychology Metaphysics Psychology | |||||||||
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Kristin Andrews (web). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (2002). Folk Psychology. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-75.
Steven Horst (1995). Eliminativism and the Ambiguity of `Belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.
Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Vs Folk Science and Belief Vs Opinion. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
Ian Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
George Botterill (1994). Beliefs, Functionally Discrete States, and Connectionist Networks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):899-906.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
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