Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasibility

Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139 (1983)
This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not committed to criteria of epistemic dependence on which foundational beliefs are indefeasible. Modest foundationalism is contrasted with coherentism and is shown to be hospitable to a causal criterion of epistemic dependence, compatible with reliabilism, and neutral with respect to skepticism.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485376
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hamid Vahid (1999). A Priori Knowledge, Experience and Defeasibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):173 – 188.
James Harold (2005). Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (1):85–105.
Richard Double (1988). Libertarianism and Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):431-439.

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