In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)
|Abstract||I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since there are no laws linking (intentional) mental states to actions, those states cannot be genuine causes of action|
|Keywords||Causation Mental Supervenience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Justin T. Tiehen (2011). Disproportional Mental Causation. Synthese 182 (3):375-391.
Robert van Gulick (1993). Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Tim Crane (1995). Mental Causation, I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (69):211-236.
Nick Zangwill (1996). Good Old Supervenience: Mental Causation on the Cheap. Synthese 106 (1):67-101.
Wim de Muijnck (2004). Two Types of Mental Causation. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):21-35.
Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
R. Philip Buckley (2001). Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Agustín Vincente (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94.
Jaegwon Kim (1992). The Nonreductivist's Trouble with Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Agustín Vicente (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads54 ( #22,460 of 722,697 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,779 of 722,697 )
How can I increase my downloads?