David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1997)
This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details Audi's compelling moral epistemology while Part II offers a unique vision of ethical concepts and an account of moral explanation, as well as a powerful model of moral realism. Part III extends this account of moral explanation to moral responsibility for both actions and character and to the relation between virtue and the actions that express it. Part IV elaborates a theory of reasons for action that locates them in relation to three of their traditionally major sources: desire, moral judgment, and value. Clear and illuminating, Audi's introduction outlines and interconnects the self-contained but cumulatively arranged essays. It also places them in relation to classical and contemporary literature, and directs readers to large segments of thematically connected material spread throughout the book. Audi ends with a powerfully synthetic final essay.
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|Call number||BJ1012.A93 1997|
|ISBN(s)||0195114698 9780195114690 9780195114683|
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Citations of this work BETA
Tristram McPherson (2015). What is at Stake in Debates Among Normative Realists? Noûs 49 (1):123-146.
Elizabeth Tropman (2012). Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge? Theoria 78 (1):26-46.
Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):126-140.
Robert Cowan (2015). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
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