Moral perception and moral knowledge

This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00187.x
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Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).
Alex Barber (2013). Science's Immunity to Moral Refutation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.

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