Reliability as a virtue

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):43 - 54 (2009)
Abstract
This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability , the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability , that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability , that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin to it and distinguishes reliability as an intellectual virtue from reliability as an intellectual power. The paper also connects reliability with insight, reasoning, knowledge, and trust. It is argued that insofar as reliability is an intellectual virtue, it must meet both external standards of correctitude and internal standards of justification.
Keywords Epistemic power  Character traits  Intellectual virtue  Justification  Knowledge  Objectivity  Predictability  Reasons-responsiveness  Trust  Virtue
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1986). Belief, Reason, and Inference. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):27-65.
Robert Audi (1988). Justification, Truth, and Reliability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):1-29.

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