Some problems of counter‐inductive policy as opposed to inductive

Inquiry 5 (1-4):267-283 (1962)
Abstract The article is concerned with the practicalist attempt to ?solve? the problem of induction. The point of departure is the concept of counter?induction introduced by Max Black and his refutation of practicalism. If we arc not to beg the question whether induction yields knowledge of the future, Max Black asserts, there is a symmetry between induction and counter?induction as methods. The main point of the article is to show that this assertion is false, at least when induction and counter?induction are compared as regards their relations to hypo?thetico?deductive method. As regards these relations, there is a striking asymmetry. The author tries to establish the following conclusion: A theory can agree with all future data and yet be false because it does not agree with all past data. If we are not to be in a position where our theories are necessarily falsified either by past or future data, we must use induction rather than counter?induction
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