The Structure of Justification

Cambridge University Press (1993)
Abstract
This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as opposed to refuting skepticism. These contrasts are applied not only to rational belief, but to rational action and the rationality of desires and intentions. The overall position is a pluralist, moderately rationalistic, internalist theory of justification and a partly externalist conception of knowledge. However, by virtue of offering a theory of rationality as well as an account of knowledge and justified belief, it will interest philosophers of ethics, science, and the social sciences and teachers and students of epistemology.
Keywords Justification (Theory of knowledge  Knowledge, Theory of
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $19.00 used (70% off)   $25.98 new (59% off)   $55.19 direct from Amazon (11% off)    Amazon page
Call number BD212.A83 1993
ISBN(s) 0521446120   9780521446129  
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,747
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.

View all 31 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

79 ( #16,291 of 1,098,829 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #26,870 of 1,098,829 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.