Weakness of will and practical judgment

Noûs 13 (2):173-196 (1979)
Weakness of will is a common phenomenon of human experience. But what is it? It has proved highly resistant to analysis, and even the accounts that seem to capture our intuitions about what weakness of will is raise problems about how it is possible. This is because these accounts seem inconsistent with some highly plausible principles about action. My aim here is to propose a new account of weakness of will and its relation to practical judgment, and to explain how weakness of will so conceived is possible.
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Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
Wayne A. Davis (1984). The Two Senses of Desire. Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.
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