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Formal logic and practical reasoning

Theory and Decision 20 (3):301-320 (1986)
In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is clearly the simplest, because it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard assertoric principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with complicated cases of practical inference. I am not daunted by these objections. My aim here is to offer some observations that will make the merits of my account easier to appreciate.
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Robert Binkley (1965). A Theory of Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 74 (4):423-448.

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