Abstract

Madel argues against the "empiricist analysis" of personal identity, claiming that "the correct view... is the one associated with the names of Reid and Butler above all: that personal identity is strict and unanalysable." He also claims that "the fundamental error in nearly everything which has been written in this field has been the failure to take note of the importance of the first person perspective" and that his own view of personal identity is much closer to the "ordinary, nonphilosophical conception" than any of its rivals. His view, which is far from easy to understand, involves the theses that the pronoun "I" is a referential term that is "completely unanalysable and irreducible... in our conceptual scheme"; that "I" refers to something "which is known by acquaintance, and cannot be analysed or described" ; that personal identity is "essentially unanalysable"; that "the issue of personal identity cannot admit of degrees"; and that "the issue of personal identity cannot be settled by convention".