Online research in philosophy

This essay explores Oakeshott's life-long engagement with the political thought of Aristotle. By examining unpublished notebooks from the 1920's and comparing them with Oakeshott's published writings we find that Oakeshott's critique of Rationalism, his account of skillful human conduct and practical judgment, and even his account of civil association owe remarkable debts to Aristotle. In particular, Aristotle's critique of Platonic and Spartan perfectionism, is strongly echoed in Oakeshott's contrast between civil and enterprise association.

Michael Oakeshott's religious view of the world stands behind much of his political and philosophical writing. In this essay I first discuss Oakeshott's view of religion and the mode of practice in his own terms. I attempt next to illuminate his idea of religion by describing it in less technical language, drawing upon other thinkers such as Georg Simmel and George Santayana, who share similar views. I then evaluate Oakeshott's view as a whole, considering whether his ideas about religion can stand up to careful scrutiny and whether they have value for present-day reflection on religion.

This paper for the first time reveals Oakeshott' early interest in writing a work of Christian apology. This "apology" was conceived in accordance with Oakeshott's religious modernism. Since Oakeshott never completed a formal apology, the author explores some early essays in which parts of the apologetic project are reflected, and then goes on to race the religious themes present in many of Oakeshott's published work. In conclusion, it is suggested that Oakeshott maybe understood as offering a concept of civilization that may be called Christian, though he is far away from any attempt to articulate a doctrinal version of Christianity.

The Skeptic’s Oakeshott poses the thesis that Michael Oakeshott’s political philosophy is best understood from the vantage point of his skepticism and his intellectual affinity to Hobbes. Margaret Thatcher based much of her political philosophy on Oakeshott’s theories, but Gerencser shows how she widely misinterpreted his work. He argues persuasively against those who understand Oakeshott in terms of the influence of British idealism. Instead, Gerencser argues that Oakeshott adopts and softens Hobbes' idea of consent as the basis of political authority. By insisting that political authority has its source in acknowledgement and recognition, Oakeshott’s philosophy opens the doors to democratic politics. The book ends with persuasive criticisms of Oakeshott.

Gilbert Ryle’s “Knowing How/Knowing That” distinction gave crisparticulation to a long-standing epistemological concern that Michael Oakeshott had: that is,what is the epistemic status of the area that comprises our waking lives, the domain of practical reasoning, of which political practice, on Oakeshott’s account, is but one aspect. This concern is set against a much broader purview: that of the nature of rationality, or more accurately the social nature of rationality.

This paper highlights a troubling tension within the philosophy of Michael Oakeshott. The relativistic stance that informs his radical constructivism gives license to socio-political conclusions we know Oakeshott couldn’t possibly accept.