Significance testing, p-values and the principle of total evidence

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):281-295 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper examines the claim that significance testing violates the Principle of Total Evidence. I argue that p-values violate PTE for two-sided tests but satisfy PTE for one-sided tests invoking a sufficient test statistic independent of the preferred theory of evidence. While the focus of the paper is to evaluate a particular claim about the relationship of significance testing and PTE, I clarify the reading of this methodological principle along the way.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidence of evidence is evidence.Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):557-559.
Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
Strategies for securing evidence through model criticism.Kent W. Staley - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-43.
Robust evidence and secure evidence claims.Kent W. Staley - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):467-488.
Images are not the evidence in neuroimaging.Colin Klein - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):265-278.
Does the evidence confirm theism more than naturalism?Michael Martin - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (3):257 - 262.
A plea for Popperian significance testing.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):220-221.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-03-05

Downloads
106 (#161,760)

6 months
6 (#522,885)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bengt Autzen
University College, Cork

References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Logic of Statistical Inference.Ian Hacking - 1965 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.

View all 17 references / Add more references