Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22 (2003)
|Abstract||To identify the set of reflectances that constitute redness, the authors must first determine which surfaces are red. They do this by relying on widespread agreement among us. However, arguments based on the possible ways in which humans would perceive colors show that mere widespread agreement among us is not a satisfactory way to determine which surfaces are red.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Bradley & Michael Tye (2001). Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves. Journal Of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487.
Michael Tye (2001). Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves. Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487.
Aaron Ben-Ze[hamza ]ev (2003). Perceptual Objects May Have Nonphysical Properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.
Margaret Atherton (2003). How Berkeley Can Maintain That Snow is White. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):101–113.
John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
C. L. Hardin (2003). Byrne and Hilbert's Chromatic Ether. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):32-33.
Jonathan Cohen (2006). Color, Variation, and the Appeal to Essences: Impasse and Resolution. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):425-438.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #132,105 of 751,156 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,000 of 751,156 )
How can I increase my downloads?