David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Ethics 11 (1):87 - 124 (2007)
In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine, not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice.
|Keywords||decent peoples human rights international law John Rawls law of peoples political liberalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Blain Neufeld (2013). Liberal Foreign Policy and the Ideal of Fair Social Cooperation. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (3):291-308.
Similar books and articles
Tarek Hayfa (2004). The Idea of Public Justification in Rawls's Law of Peoples. Res Publica 10 (3):233-246.
Rex Martin & David A. Reidy (eds.) (2006). Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? Blackwell Pub..
David A. Reidy (2007). A Just Global Economy: In Defense of Rawls. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (2):193 - 236.
Mark Rigstad (2011). Republicanism and Geopolitical Domination. Journal of Political Power 4 (2):279-300.
Blain Neufeld (2005). Civic Respect, Political Liberalism, and Non-Liberal Societies. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (3):275-299.
Edmund N. Santurri (2005). Global Justice After the Fall Christian Realism and the “Law of Peoples”. Journal of Religious Ethics 33 (4):783-814.
Samuel Freeman (2006). The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice. Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (1):29-68.
Brian E. Butler (2001). There Are Peoples and There Are Peoples: A Critique of Rawls' Law of Peoples. Florida Philosophical Review 1 (2):1-24.
Walter Riker (2004). Rawls's Decent Peoples and the Democratic Peace Thesis. Social Philosophy Today 20:137-153.
T. Porter (2012). Rawls, Reasonableness, and International Toleration. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (4):382-414.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads86 ( #45,785 of 1,790,294 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #200,312 of 1,790,294 )
How can I increase my downloads?