David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9) (2012)
Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that it is not a constraint on such theories that we must somehow have justification to believe that we are not massively deceived
|Keywords||Epistemolgoy Skepticism Closure|
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Citations of this work BETA
David James Barnett (2013). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies:1-29.
Annalisa Coliva (2012). Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What Else?!). Synthese 189 (2):235-254.
Giorgio Volpe (2012). Cornerstones: You'd Better Believe Them. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
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