LFIs with Marco's Schema
| Abstract | We construct a modular semantic frameworks for LFIs (logics of formal (in)consistency) which extends the framework developed in [1; 3], but includes Marco’s schema too (and so practically all the axioms considered in [11] plus a few more). In addition, the paper provides another demonstration of the power of the idea of nondeterministic semantics, especially when it is combined with the idea of using truth-values to encode relevant data concerning propositions | |||||||||
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Elia Zardini (2008). Truth and What is Said. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574.
R. T. Cook (2012). The T-Schema is Not a Logical Truth. Analysis 72 (2):231-239.
Luca Moretti (2007). A Thick Realist Consequence of Wright's Minimalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):24–38.
Virginia Slaughter (2004). Emulator as Body Schema. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):415-416.
Christopher Gauker (2001). T-Schema Deflationism Versus Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Analysis 61 (270):129–136.
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