Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. By John Greco. (Cambridge UP, 2010. Pp. x + 205. Price £17.99/US$29.99.) [Book Review]

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):208-211 (2012)
A Review of John Greco's book Acheiving Knowledge. The critical points I make involve three claims Greco makes that represent common ground between the reliabilists (including agent reliabilists like himself) and the character epistemologists (which would include myself): I. Such virtues are often needed to make our cognitive abilities reliable (to turn mere faculties into excellences); II. Such virtues might be essentially involved in goods other than knowledge; III. Such virtues might be valuable in themselves.
Keywords virtue epistemology  reliabilism  epistemic responsibility  epistemic value  epistemic normativity  evidentialism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00012.x
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