(More) Springs of my Discontent

Logos and Episteme (1):131-137 (2012)
Abstract
A further reply to Trent Dougherty, author of Evidentialism and its Discontents, on a range of issues regarding a proper understanding of epistemic normativity and doxastic responsibility. The relative importance of synchronic and diachronic concerns with epistemic agency is discussed, both with respect to epistemology proper, as well as in connection to broader concerns with ‘ethics of belief’ and ‘epistemology of disagreement.’
Keywords epistemic responsibility  epistemology of disagreement  ethics of belief  synchronic and diachronic  virtue epistemology  evidentialism
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