Recent work on virtue epistemology

American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26 (1997)
Abstract
This article traces a growing interest among epistemologists in the intellectuals of epistemic virtues. These are cognitive dispositions exercised in the formation of beliefs. Attempts to give intellectual virtues a central normative and/or explanatory role in epistemology occur together with renewed interest in the ethics/epistemology analogy, and in the role of intellectual virtue in Aristotle's epistemology. The central distinction drawn here is between two opposed forms of virtue epistemology, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. The article develops the shared and distinctive claims made by contemporary proponents of each form, in their respective treatments of knowledge and justification.
Keywords epistemology, ETHICS, knowledge, Reliabilism, virtue
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Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):181-199.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2006). On the Epistemology of Language. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):677-696.

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