Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22 (2001)
| Abstract | This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Intentional generalization Fodor Frege | |||||||||
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