Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22 (2001)
This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
Keywords Intentional generalization  Fodor  Frege
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2001.10717558
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PhilPapers Archive Murat Aydede, Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?
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