In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer (2005)
|Abstract||There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its apparent consequences. The worry can be put in the form of a question, which Fodor called the|
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