David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 39 (2):197-255 (2005)
This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal con-cepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspec-tion. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory con-cepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information the-ory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and pre-dicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a sub-stantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them.
|Keywords||Phenomenal concepts Explanatory gap|
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References found in this work BETA
Alan Ross Anderson & Kenneth M. Sayre (1966). Recognition: A Study in the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (65):387.
Murat Aydede (2003). Is Introspection Inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
Citations of this work BETA
Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Stephen Biggs (2011). Abduction and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
John Kulvicki (2007). What is What It's Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation. Synthese 156 (2):205 - 229.
Jason Bridges (2006). Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy. Noûs 40 (3):522ï¿½547.
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