Is introspection inferential?

In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate (2003)
Suppose there is a red ball against a uniformly gray background moving toward my left. I am seeing the moving red ball. I am having a visual experience that carries the information (among other things) that [the ball] is red.1 Now supposing that I have the concepts RED and SEEING, and all my other cognitive (including introspective) mechanisms are intact and working normally, the job is to say exactly how I do come to know that I am seeing [the ball] as red. How do I come to know, as I shall sometimes put it, that I am seeing red?
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