David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50 (2000)
According to the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT ? Language of Thought Hypothesis, or LOTH), propositional attitudes, such as belief, desire, and the like, are triadic relations among subjects, propositions, and internal mental representations. These representations form a representational _system_ physically realized in the brain of sufficiently sophisticated cognitive organisms. Further, this system of representations has a combinatorial syntax and semantics, but the processes that operate on the representations are causally sensitive only to their syntax, not to their semantics. On this approach, a first pass account of propositional attitudes is the following (cf. Field 1978: 37 and Fodor 1987: 17)
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Susan Schneider (2009). The Nature of Symbols in the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.
Susan Schneider (2009). LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room. Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.
Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider (2008). Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
Matthew Rellihan (2013). Informational Semantics and Frege Cases. Acta Analytica 28 (3):267-294.
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