Deflating Existential Commitment: A Case for Nominalism

OUP Usa (2004)
If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense
Keywords nominalism   mathematics   platonism   metaphysics   toread
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ISBN(s) 9780195159882  
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Stacie Friend (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.
Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Agustín Rayo (2007). Ontological Commitment. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428–444.

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Władysław Krajewski (1992). Questions of the Objects of Knowledge and Types of Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (3):205-213.

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